547 U. S. __ (2006). 1, 2, 4, 18 (1978 Memo & Order). Compare Eisenberg, 197 F.3d, at 133, with Comfort, 418 F.3d, at 13. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. Four basic considerations have led me to this view. 3, p. 57 ([T]he historical background that exists, certainly in this Virginia situation, with all the strife and the history that we have shown in this record, shows a basis, a real basis, for the classification that has been made); id., at 69 (describing the potential abolition of segregation as contrary to the customs, the traditions and the mores of what we might claim to be a great people, established through generations, who themselves are fiercely and irrevocably dedicated to the preservation of the white and colored races). See id., at 342; see also Croson, 488 U. S., at 498; Wygant, 476 U. S., at 275 (plurality opinion). Whenever the board finds that racial imbalance exists in a public school, it shall give written notice to the appropriate school committee, which shall prepare a plan to eliminate imbalance and file a copy with the board. of Boston v. Board of Education, O.T. 1967, No. Indeed, the social scientists brief rather cautiously claims the existence of any benefit at all, describing the positive impact as modest, id., at 13, acknowledging that there appears to be little or no effect on math scores, id., at 14, and admitting that the underlying reasons for these gains in achievement are not entirely clear, id., at 15. The distinctions between de jure and de facto segregation extended to the remedies available to governmental units in addition to the courts. The histories that follow set forth these basic facts. See 539 U. S., at 320. The Courts misuse of the three-tiered approach to Equal Protection analysis merely reconfirms my own view that there is only one such Clause in the Constitution. However, racial imbalance without intentional state action to separate the races does not amount to segregation. The dissent rests on the assumptions that these sweeping race-based classifications of persons are permitted by existing precedents; that its confident endorsement of race categories for each child in a large segment of the community presents no danger to individual freedom in other, prospective realms of governmental regulation; and that the racial classifications used here cause no hurt or anger of the type the Constitution prevents. ", 488 U.S., at 519, 109 S. Ct. 706, 102 L. Ed. The entire gist of the analysis in Grutter was that the admissions program at issue there focused on each applicant as an individual, and not simply as a member of a particular racial group. Justice Kennedy asserts that the dissent must "brush aside two concepts of central importance" to uphold the racial classification in the case. Guided by these principles, the Court concluded: [W]e cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable, or more obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment than the acts of Congress requiring separate schools for colored children in the District of Columbia. Id., at 550551. Evidence that race is a good proxy for other factors that might be correlated with educational benefits does not support a compelling interest in the use of race to achieve academic results. The Court likewise paid heed to societal practices, local expectations, and practical consequences by looking to the established usages, customs and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order. Ibid. It initially assigned each student to his or her neighborhood school, but it permitted each student freely to transfer between elementary schools within each cluster provided that the transferring student (a) was black if transferring from a predominantly black school to a predominantly white school, or (b) was white if transferring from a predominantly white school to a predominantly black school. And the Court, using the very phrase that Justice Marshall had used to describe strict scrutinys application to any exclusionary use of racial criteria, sought to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is as likely to condemn inclusive uses of race-conscious criteria as it is to invalidate exclusionary uses. Compare ante, at 39 (It was not the inequality of the facilities but the fact of legally separating children on the basis of race on which the Court relied to find a constitutional violation in 1954), with Juris. Plessy, supra, at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U. S. 237, 249250 (1991); Green v. School Bd. For the 2006-2007 school year, the school district has suspended the tiebreaker pending litigation. [32], Plurality opinion by Chief Justice Roberts. Brief for Petitioner at 11. As well, the District points out that it is no longer using the admission system that serves as the basis of this suit, and has not for several years, further demonstrating that any future injury is far from imminent. CRYSTAL D. MEREDITH, custodial parent and next friend of JOSHUA RYAN M c DONALD, PETITIONER. Upon realizing that the litigation would not be resolved in time for assignment decisions for the 20022003 school year, the Ninth Circuit withdrew its opinion, 294 F.3d 1084 (2002) (Parents Involved III), vacated the injunction, and, pursuant to Wash. Rev. I cannot rely upon Swanns statement that the use of race-conscious limits is permissible without showing, rather than simply asserting, that the statement represents a constitutional principle firmly rooted in federal and state law. It is an interest in maintaining hard-won gains. CitationParents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. After the site was removed, the district offered the comforting clarification that the site was not intended to hold onto unsuccessful concepts such as melting pot or colorblind mentality. Ibid. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U. S. 899, 909910 (1996) ([A]n effort to alleviate the effects of societal discrimination is not a compelling interest); Croson, supra, at 498499; Wygant, 476 U. S., at 276 (plurality opinion) (Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy); id., at 288 (OConnor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ([A] governmental agencys interest in remedying societal discrimination, that is, discrimination not traceable to its own actions, cannot be deemed sufficiently compelling to pass constitutional muster). Nevertheless, the dissent tries to cast doubt on the historical fact that the Seattle schools were never segregated by law by citing allegations that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and other organizations made in court filings to the effect that Seattles schools were once segregated by law. Sign up for our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you. Of these, 209 were assigned to a school that was one of their choices, 87 of whom were assigned to the same school to which they would have been assigned without the racial tiebreaker. For the 20002001 school year, five of these schools were oversubscribedBallard, Nathan Hale, Roosevelt, Garfield, and Franklinso much so that 82 percent of incoming ninth graders ranked one of these schools as their first choice. See Tr. Id. PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, PETITIONER. With this factual background in mind, I turn to the legal question: Does the United States Constitution prohibit these school boards from using race-conscious criteria in the limited ways at issue here? Moreover, Louisvilles history makes clear that a community under a court order to desegregate might submit a race-conscious remedial plan before the court dissolved the order, but with every intention of following that plan even after dissolution. . Yesterday, the citizens of this Nation could look for guidance to this Courts unanimous pronouncements concerning desegregation. See Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d, at 1166; McFarland II, 416 F.3d, at 514; Comfort v. Lynn School Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 13 (CA1 2005). past cases have est. The plurality also points to the school districts use of numerical goals based upon the racial breakdown of the general school population, and it faults the districts for failing to prove that no other set of numbers will work. Part IB, supra. Attorney General, to John F. Kennedy, President (Jan. 24, 1963) (hereinafter Kennedy Report), available at http://www.gilderlehrman.org/search/collection_pdfs/05/63/0/05630.pdf (all Internet materials as visited June 26, 2007, and available in Clerk of Courts case file) (reporting successful efforts by the Government to induce voluntary desegregation). It is not up to the school boardsthe very government entities whose race-based practices we must strictly scrutinizeto determine what interests qualify as compelling under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The racial breakdown of this nonwhite group is approximately 23.8 percent Asian-American, 23.1 percent African-American, 10.3 percent Latino, and 2.8 percent Native-American. Jefferson County has failed to present any evidence that it considered alternatives, even though the district already claims that its goals are achieved primarily through means other than the racial classifications. And the combination of the three unsubstantiated elements does not produce an interest any more compelling than that represented by each element independently. McDonald v. Chicago of Ed., 395 U. S., at 232. Moreover, the school boards have no interest in remedying the sundry consequences of prior segregation unrelated to schooling, such as housing patterns, employment practices, economic conditions, and social attitudes. Post, at 38. In a word, the school plans under review do not involve the kind of race-based harm that has led this Court, in other contexts, to find the use of race-conscious criteria unconstitutional. Andy was accepted into this selective program but, because of the racial tiebreaker, was denied assignment to Ballard High School. There must be at least 15 percent nonwhite students under Jefferson Countys plan; in Seattle, more than three times that figure. Far from being narrowly tailored, this system threatens to defeat its own ends, and the district has provided no convincing explanation for its design. of Ed. First, in schools that were formerly segregated by law, race-based measures are sometimes constitutionally compelled to remedy prior school segregation. Pp. 10925, 26 Fed. Hundreds of state and federal statutes and regulations use racial classifications for educational or other purposes. in No. Light, New Evidence on School Desegregation v (1987) (hereinafter Welch) (prepared for the Commission on Civil Rights) (reviewing a sample of 125 school districts, constituting 20% of national public school enrollment, that had experimented with nearly 300 different plans over 18 years). The District also contends that the racial tiebreaker was necessary because other race-neutral activities were inadequate to achieve their compelling interests. It argues that it should not be force to walk the tightrope between violating the constitution by failing to integrate schools and violating the constitution by integrating schools. Who exactly is white and who is nonwhite? This working backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than working forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the purported benefits, is a fatal flaw under our existing precedent. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencers Social Statics). Yet our tradition is to go beyond present achievements, however significant, and to recognize and confront the flaws and injustices that remain. See Brief for Respondent at 27. In 2000, Federal Judge John Heyburn, after finding that the JCPS school system did not need to be under a court-ordered desegregation policy, ruled that race could not be used for student assignment placement in the JCPS school system in regard to their magnet school programs. The districts point to dicta in a prior opinion in which the Court suggested that, while not constitutionally mandated, it would be constitutionally permissible for a school district to seek racially balanced schools as a matter of educational policy. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. Such reservations and preliminary analyses of course did not decide the merits of this questionas evidenced by the disagreement among the lower courts on this issue. 05915, at 410. 1 and Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education ( PICS ). The plans at issue are not overly different from other plans that school districts have used with the express or implicit approval of courts. See also Hanawalt 31; Pub. In Seattle, then, the benefits of racial diversity require enrollment of at least 31 percent white students; in Jefferson County, at least 50 percent. area/siso/disprof/2005/DP05all.pdf; Brief for Respond- The suit alleged that they were denied entrance because they were black. See also Quillian & Campbell 541. The second government interest we have recognized as compelling for purposes of strict scrutiny is the interest in diversity in higher education upheld in Grutter, 539 U. S., at 328. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (U.S. 2007). Id., at 470. Pp. of Oral Arg. After decades of vibrant life, they would all, under the pluralitys logic, be written out of the law. No. Those entrusted with directing our public schools can bring to bear the creativity of experts, parents, administrators, and other concerned citizens to find a way to achieve the compelling interests they face without resorting to widespread governmental allocation of benefits and burdens on the basis of racial classifications. For the dissent, in contrast, individualized scrutiny is simply beside the point. Post, at 55. 540, 541 (2003) (hereinafter Quillian & Campbell); Dawkins & Braddock, The Continuing Significance of Desegregation: School Racial Composition and African American Inclusion in American Society, 63 J. Negro Ed. . See, e.g., id., at 111. . In addition, the Court stated that [a]ttending an ethnically diverse school, id., at 473, could help prepare minority children for citizenship in our pluralistic society, hopefully teaching members of the racial majority to live in harmony and mutual respect with children of minority heritage. Ibid.